Summary of McCrary v. Bianco, 122 Nev. Adv. Op. 10 by Kasiske, Eunice
Scholarly Commons @ UNLV Law
Nevada Supreme Court Summaries Law Journals
2-9-2006
Summary of McCrary v. Bianco, 122 Nev. Adv. Op.
10
Eunice Kasiske
Nevada Law Journal
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholars.law.unlv.edu/nvscs
Part of the Civil Procedure Commons, and the Dispute Resolution and Arbitration Commons
This Case Summary is brought to you by Scholarly Commons @ UNLV Law, an institutional repository administered by the Wiener-Rogers Law
Library at the William S. Boyd School of Law. For more information, please contact david.mcclure@unlv.edu.
Recommended Citation
Kasiske, Eunice, "Summary of McCrary v. Bianco, 122 Nev. Adv. Op. 10" (2006). Nevada Supreme Court Summaries. Paper 550.
http://scholars.law.unlv.edu/nvscs/550
 1
McCrary v. Bianco, 122 Nev. Adv. Op. 10 (Feb. 9, 2006)1 
 
CIVIL PROCEDURE- PREJUDGMENT INTEREST 
 
Summary 
 
 Thomas and Rebecca McCrary (“McCrary”) appealed from a post-verdict district court 
order awarding attorney fees based upon the cost shifting provisions of NRCP 68 and NRS 
17.115.  Dominic Bianco (“Bianco”) cross-appealed from the denial of its motion for partial 
satisfaction of judgment.  McCrary unsuccessfully argued that the district court erred in its 
failure to consider pre-offer attorney fees and costs as part of its determination of the total 
judgment for cost-shifting purposes.  McCrary successfully argued that the district court erred in 
not including pre-offer prejudgment interest in its comparison between the total amount awarded 
and the offer of judgment, for cost-shifting purposes.  Bianco unsuccessfully argued that he 
should receive an offset under the repair contract.  McCrary unsuccessfully argued that the offer 
of judgment was invalid for lack of service and failure to file in a timely manner.  The district 
court’s decision was affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.   
 
Disposition/Outcome 
 
 Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.  In this appeal, the Nevada Supreme 
Court clarified the cost-shifting provisions of NRCP 68 and NRS 17.115 concerning offers of 
judgment in civil cases.  The Court held that district courts must, where applicable, and where 
the offer did not preclude such comparison, include pre-offer judgment interest along with the 
principal judgment amount when comparing the judgment obtained and an offer of judgment in 
post-trial proceedings for relief.  The Court also held that the district court properly excluded 
pre-offer attorney fees and costs in making its comparison.    
 
Factual and Procedural History 
 
 McCrary contracted with Bianco to repair insured water damage to their home.  McCrary 
agreed to pay Bianco $9,926.76 for his work.  However, McCrary was unhappy with the work 
performed, and brought suit against Bianco for damages based upon negligence and breach of 
contract claims for relief.  In addition, McCrary alleged that Bianco caused $75,000 in additional 
damages to their home. 
 
 Bianco attempted to serve a timely pretrial offer of judgment to McCrary’s attorney.  The 
offer of judgment was for a principal amount of $23,999 and provided for a separate award of 
statutory costs, in the event of acceptance.  The offer specifically stated, “Plaintiff shall be 
entitled to statutory costs of suit.”    McCrary did not respond to the offer, and it was deemed 
rejected. 
 
 At trial, the jury awarded McCrary a total of $15,800; $10,800 was awarded for the 
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negligence claim and $5,000 was awarded for the breach of contract claim.  Bianco then filed a 
copy of its offer of judgment, and both parties moved for attorney’s fees.  McCrary sought 
recovery of fees under NRS 18.010(2) and a provision in the repair contract.  Bianco sought 
recovery of attorney’s fees under the cost-shifting provisions of NRCP 68 and NRS 17.115.  In 
addition, Bianco sought an offset under the repair contract for $11,914 which was previously 
paid to McCrary by their homeowner’s insurer. 
 
 The district court ultimately agreed with Bianco regarding the offer of judgment, and 
awarded Bianco $15,000 in attorney’s fees plus costs of suit.  Because the offer exceeded the 
judgment under the district court’s analysis, the district court refused to award attorney’s fees to 
McCrary.  The district court determined the offer of judgment exceeded the judgment by 
comparing the offer of judgment and the jury verdict.  Further, the district court stated that 
Bianco’s offer of judgment was reasonable in its timing and amount and that McCrary’s refusal 
of the offer was grossly unreasonable.  In regards to Bianco’s request for the offset, the district 
court denied the request. 
 
 On appeal, McCrary challenged the fee award to Bianco and the district court’s refusal to 
award attorney’s fees to them.  On cross-appeal, Bianco asserted that the district court erred in 
not allowing the offset as a partial satisfaction of judgment. 
            
Discussion 
 
 McCrary asserted that the district court should have included accrued pre-offer attorney’s 
fees, pre-offer costs, and pre-offer prejudgment interest as part of the judgment when it 
compared the judgment with the offer.  The Nevada Supreme Court stated that the district court 
was correct in not considering attorney’s fees and costs, but agreed with McCrary that the 
district court should have considered pre-offer prejudgment interest as part of the judgment when 
it compared the judgment with the offer.   
  
 The Court discussed NRCP 68 and NRS 17.115 as setting forth Nevada’s “offer of 
judgment” protocols.  McCrary argued that the 1998/1999 changes to NRCP 68 and NRS 17.115 
validated their contention that pre-offer costs and fees may be considered as part of the judgment 
for purposes of comparing the offer of judgment to the judgment awarded.   
 
 The Court stated that the 1998/1999 changes embraced a new comparison formula.  
Under the new formula, in the event that the offer provided for a separate award of costs, the 
district court should conduct a post-trial comparison between the amount of the offer and the 
principal amount of the judgment.  The Court noted that the 1999 amendments to NRS 17.115 
reflected changes in the comparison formula by making costs part of the comparison when the 
offer precluded a separate award of costs.  The Court emphasized, however, that this was not 
awarded as part of the judgment; rather, the pre-offer costs were calculated, added to the offer, 
and then compared with the principal amount of the judgment.  However, this analysis was not 
relevant to the present case because Bianco’s offer did not preclude a separate award of costs 
upon acceptance.   
  
 The Court cited its decision in Bowyer v. Taack, where the Court held that, when litigants 
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are precluded from obtaining taxable costs and attorney fees under NRCP 68 and NRS 17.115, 
they are likewise precluded from recovering under NRS 18.010.2  The Court further held that 
costs and fees could not be included as part of a judgment to determine whether the judgment 
obtained exceeded the offer for relief purposes under the cost-shifting provisions.3  The Court 
stated that, to this extent, when the offer provided for a separate award of costs, Bowyer 
remained valid precedent, regarding exclusion of costs and fees within the comparison.  The 
Court emphasized that costs become part of the equation only when the offer precludes a 
separate award for costs.  Thus, the Court concluded that, in the present case, the district court 
correctly refused to consider pre-offer fees and other costs generated by McCrary in making their 
NRCP 68 and NRS 17.115 comparisons.   
 
 Next, the Court discussed pre-offer prejudgment interest and offers of judgment.  The 
Court again referred to its decision in Bowyer.   In Bowyer, the Court held that a claimant who 
failed to secure a judgment greater than a previously tendered offer of judgment could not 
recover awards of prejudgment interest under a court rule or statute.4  The Court further held that 
prejudgment interest could not be included as part of a judgment to determine whether the 
judgment exceeded the offer.5  The Court noted that this holding was consistent with Nevada 
statutes, at the time of the decision. 
 
 However, in 1998, the Court amended NRCP 68 by promulgating NRCP 68(f)(1), which 
limited the “loss of prejudgment interest sanction” for failure to exceed an offer of judgment to 
loss of post-offer judgment interest.  The Legislature amended NRS 17.115 to conform the 
statute to the rule.  In the present case, the Court noted that, although pre-offer prejudgment 
interest was not expressly included in the 1998/1999 comparison formula, there was no reason 
not to include such an award in the comparison.  Thus, in the present case, the Nevada Supreme 
Court held that pre-offer prejudgment interest could be added to the principal award as part of 
the comparison formula. 
 
    The Court further concluded that the offer should be construed against Bianco to allow 
the pre-offer prejudgment interest to be included with the judgment in comparing the judgment 
with the offer because the offer was “inclusive of all claims” and noted that Bianco’s offer did 
not preclude inclusion of prejudgment interest in the comparison with the offer.   
  
 Thus, the Nevada Supreme Court reversed this matter with instructions to compute the 
amount of pre-offer prejudgment interest and to add that sum to the judgment award for purposes 
of comparing the judgment to the offer of judgment.  If the principal award and pre-offer 
prejudgment interest now exceeded the offer, Bianco should not be awarded relief under NRCP 
68 and NRS 17.115.  If the principal award and pre-offer prejudgment interest did not exceed the 
offer of judgment, the district court could consider granting Bianco relief.   
 
 The Court discussed McCrary’s alternative argument that the offer of judgment was 
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invalid for lack of service and for failure to file the offer until after the conclusion of trial.  The 
Court noted that Bianco had attempted service by mail but had mailed the offer to the wrong zip 
code.  However, the record confirmed that Bianco had sent all pleadings to the same address 
with the wrong zip code, and that McCrary’s attorney had received all other pleadings sent to 
this incorrect address.  The district court had found that McCrary’s counsel received the offer, 
and this finding was supported by substantial evidence in the record.  Further, the Court stated 
that failure to file the offer until after the trial was not fatal to relief under the cost-shifting 
provisions of NRCP 68 and NRS 17.115.    
 
 Finally, the Court discussed Bianco’s cross-appeal.  The Court stated that the insurance 
proceeds were only payable to Bianco in the event that there was no breach of contract.  Because 
the jury found that Bianco breached the contract, and neither party challenged this decision, the 
Court stated that Bianco’s cross-appeal was without merit.   
 
Conclusion 
 
 The Court determined that the district court properly refused to award or consider pre-
offer attorney’s fees and costs as part of its determination under NRCP 68 and NRS 17.115.  
However, the Court held that the district court erred in refusing to include pre-offer prejudgment 
interest to the total judgment awarded in its comparison between the total judgment awarded at 
trial and Bianco’s offer of judgment.  Thus, the Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and 
remanded the matter for further proceedings consistent with its opinion.  
